The analysis of the offer premiums and of the means of payment should not be done separately. In the empirical literature these two variables are often considered independently although they may have endogenous relation in a contractual setting. Using a sample of European M&As over the 2000-2010 decade, we show that these two variables are jointly set up in a contractual approach. The relationship of the percentage of cash with the offer premium is positive: higher premiums will yield payments with more cash.
Crossing takeover premiums and mix of payment: Empirical test of contractual setting in M&A transactions

Introduction
The empirical literature privileges largely the acquirer's point of view: Why does he take the decision to bid for a target? How does he set his offered price? However, according Faccio and Masulis (2005) , « In assessing potential determinants of an M&A payment method, our focus is on a bidder's M&A financing choices, recognizing that targets can also influence the final terms of an M&A deal. » We will follow the latter's intuition by analyzing a (successful) takeover as a contractual agreement where both parties find enough interest to lead the offer to a success. The two key variables defining a contract are the takeover premium, and the offered means of payment. The basis of a contractual approach is that these key variables are jointly determined and agreed as a package. We will not follow the track of numerous empirical studies that looks individually at premiums or means of payment because such an approach is incomplete.
A M&A is an economic project per se that bears some economic risk either for the target's shareholder or for the acquirer's shareholders. This new risk can be dealt with ex ante, at the contract setting using an appropriate choice of means of payment. Cash payment, i.e.
receiving liquidity, is a way for the seller to avoid risk. For the same, shares payment is a way to bear some of the new risk introduced by the project. The M&A project and the means of payment are linked together as part of the same global setting agreed between the seller and the buyer. The means of payment decision is a part of the contract, which is as important as the price itself. In a risk sharing perspective, the means of payment are ex ante choice to share the expected risk (and profit) from the transaction. This should be particularly true in mixed payment schemes where the relative percentage between shares and cash payment is an equilibrium variable. In these contexts, the package of mixed payment percentage and takeover premium will define the contract, and both will refer to asymmetry of information.
The link between these two variables has not been extensively analyzed in the empirical literature.
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This paper tests the hypothesis of a global contractual setting linking the takeover offer premium and the means of payment. Empirical studies have often privileged the analysis of either the takeover premiums, or the means of payment. A joint empirical analysis is developed with regard to a sample of 528 EU deals using systems of simultaneous equations.
We show that offer premiums and means of payment interfere. We consider completed deals in the empirics of this paper. For a deal to succeed, it needs to satisfy both the bidder and the seller. Our findings support the view of M&A deals as global contractual equilibrium.
The development will be divided into three parts. Section 1 proposes a review of the literature. Section 2 will present the sample and the variables. The empirical results are analyzed in the third section. A conclusion follows.
Review of Literature
The takeover premium and the mix of payment have often been considered in separate strands of the literature.
Takeover premium
Takeover premium have been extensively studies in the empirical corporate finance literature in relation to ownership structure or to acquirer's or target's characteristics.
-) Ownership
Takeover premium level is linked with the ownership structure of the target. The high bargaining power of large blockholder may force acquirers to higher bids (Stulz, 1988) . The use of controlling devices such as double voting rights, separation of votes and cash flow rights may enhance that positive relationship. The existence of shareholders agreement is also viewed as an efficient mechanism of coordination inside the controlling group. It leads to higher firm valuation (Volpin, 2002; Belot, 2010) , and it results in higher takeover premiums.
Either the existence of an agreement between blockholders or the aggregate voting rights of the controlling party influences positively the takeover premium for French firms (Belot, 2010) . However premiums are also the consequence of private benefits paid to the inside owners or to incumbent blockholders. The latter trade their benefits against a higher premium, otherwise the incumbent shareholder will not accept to loose their control and /or their private halshs-00636614, version 1 -27 Oct 2011
benefits. Bebchuk (1994) , Burkard et al. (2000) or Burkart and Panunzi, (2004) support theoretically this view. Empirically, Moeller (2005) gives support to it.
Deal characteristics also are important. The contestability of the offer is an element leading to higher prices (Stulz et al., 1990; Song and Walking, 1993) . The empirical literature documents a positive relation between the target cumulative abnormal returns and the competitive nature of the bid.
-) Firms' characteristics
When the target and the acquirer belong to the same economic sector, merging may yield economies of scale and higher profitability. The consistency of the project is measured by proximity or identity of the SIC codes of the buyer and the seller. Synergy gains will motivate higher bids by the bidder (Sundarsanam et al. 1996 , Officer 2003 . If the acquirer has already a stake of the target's capital, it will give him a possible access to inside information. The toehold is defined by the percentage of shares owned by the bidder; it will explain a lower asymmetry of information. Betton and Eckbo (2000) showed that a toehold influences negatively the takeover premium.
On the target's characteristics side, size is a traditional control variable. The premium is spread over a larger investment. In line with Officer (2003) , the relationship between size and premium is expected to be negative. The financial leverage of the target is also important because it may signal a monitoring of the target firm by debtors. This is particularly true for controlled companies or family firms. It will limit private benefits and then explain lower premiums. On the other hand, higher debt leverage may be used as a power enhancing tool for the controlling group and consequently may help appropriating private benefits. Stulz (1988) mentions that target's entrenched controller may force a bidder to pay a higher premium. So the sign of the relationship is not defined.
The process of takeover develops in a context of a double information asymmetry between the acquiring and target firms. Hansen (1987) was the first to mention the so-called "double lemons effect", where each one has private information on his own value and has incomplete information on the nature of the assets he receives. The bidder buys assets of uncertain value.
Being risk averse, he is willing to pay less when facing an information risk. He may also want to share the valuation risk by paying with equity of the newly merged group. The target's halshs-00636614, version 1 -27 Oct 2011
shareholders will receive shares based on a new economic project based on forecasted profits and synergies. They may also insure themselves by receiving cash and avoiding share payment. Asymmetries of information will explain the risk-sharing attitudes of the buyer and the seller and consequently the choice of a mix of payment (see below). Hansen (1987) measures the double asymmetry of information using the relative size of the target compared with the size of the bidder. The risk-sharing explanation is developed by Berkovitch and Narayanan (1990) who introduced the sharing of the synergy gains between the buyer and the target firm's shareholders into the analysis. The seller's appropriation of the synergy gains is linked to the difference in information between the two parties. Chang and Mais (1998) expanded the idea that an exchange of information can help to solve the problem of double information asymmetry. They introduced a prior holding in the target's capital ("toehold") as a means to reduce the buyer's asymmetry of information. In such a situation the buyer has a better inside knowledge of the target, especially if he holds a large portion of capital (Goldman and Qian, 2004) . Cheng et al. (2008) used a sample of US firms to compare asymmetry of information, bid premiums and means of payment. They show that means of payment and bid premiums are interdependent, with means of payment conditioning heavily the price paid in the deal for a given asymmetry of information between the two parties. This suggests that the two terms are linked in a contract design perspective.
Means of payment
The literature devoted to means of payment follows another strand. A payment by shares has no consequence on the cash situation of the firm because the acquirers issues new shares.
However, it may have consequence in terms of (i) signal to the firm's shareholders and (ii) wealth situation of the final shareholders because of the dilution of the perspectives in value creation.
In a M&A decision, a bidder is facing a choice between using cash and stocks as deal payment consideration. This alternative choice has conflicting effects and follows different explanations. A first rationale ensues from the starting idea that the financing decision is separated from the investment decision. The M&A project is first selected and then the acquirer considers ways to optimally finance the possible deal. The constraints here are the limits of the financial leverage or of the shareholder control structure of the bidder. Generally bidders have limited cash and liquid assets, so cash offers require debt or equity financing.
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The pecking order theory says that acquirers will first choose internal funds. These funds are available either as holdings or as internally generated cash flow. Initiators with cash availability will prefer cash payment (Martin, 1996) . Partial or full payment in shares may express the existence of financial constraints (Myers and Majluf, 1984 Externally financed M&A are funded by 30% by equity and 70% by using debt. In a sample of Europeans deals they show that the financing decision and the choice of means of payment are driven by distinct determinants and are not interdependent. However, there show a significant evidence of an indirect and reverse influence of the means of payment on the internal/external financing choice. There is also an influence of the bidder's choice to share or not the risk of the transaction with the target's shareholders and/or to buy out these shareholders. In such a situation, equity payment and equity financing are privileged.
The means of payment choice is also sensible to the genuine context of the deal. Strategic competition between bidders is the first reason given to prefer cash. Fishman (1989) analyzes the strategic role of the means of payment in public takeover and considers that a pure cash offer is dissuasive and signals good quality target firms. However, his model leads to cashonly or share-only payments. Fishman relates the payment by cash to the future profitability of the target as expected by the competing bidders. Cornu and Isakov (2000) develop a model halshs-00636614, version 1 -27 Oct 2011
in a context of a competitive offer between two acquiring firms. The risk, when the first one sets a price offer and a means of payment, is to trigger a counter-offer by the other firm. In order to disclose information on his strategy, the first bidder can use a signal through an announcement of a pure cash payment or a pure share payment. However, the large majority of mergers and acquisitions are non-hostile and the means of payment are diversified. The characteristics of the payment scheme have to be analyzed in a context of a known success of the takeover
The portion of capital the bidder wants to receive (beyond gaining control) is an adjustment variable. That fraction reveals private information about the buyer's real value. If the means of payment disclose private signals to other parties, it will in return also influence the process of negotiation. Hansen's model explains the probability of paying in cash or in shares but does not focus on mixed-payment schemes. Double asymmetry of information may explain risk sharing choices and payment with shares issued by the initiator. Eckbo, Giammarino and Heinkel (1990) refer explicitly to the idea of an optimal mixed cash-shares payment. They were the first to highlight that the weighting between these two means of payment will reveal to other parties the respective quality of competitive buyers. Martin (1996) links the cash payment with private information: an acquirer with good growth opportunities will prefer a shares payment.
The empirical literature on means of payment identifies the existence of different rationale explaining the cash or the equity choice (Carleton et al., 1983) . The cash paid acquisitions are found to have better performances after (Linn et al. 2001) . The literature on mixed cashequity payments is relatively recent. On a factual ground, mixed payment schemes have become increasingly important in mergers and acquisitions, particularly when considering offers for large firms. Goergen and Renneboog (2004) and 22% mixed payments. However, the latter represented 32.3% of the total value of the transaction, pointing out that mixed payment takeovers occur particularly in the higher value transactions. For mixed-payment takeovers, the average percentage of cash was 49% but with a standard deviation of 50%, corresponding to huge differences within payment schemes.
Cross border M&A are usually more paid in cash. This traditional setting is documented by Chevalier and Redor (2007) . They show that geographical distance is a good proxy for cultural distance. It is also a source of asymmetry of information for transactions located in far countries. This explains why cross border acquisitions are per se more paid in cash. Their dependant variable is the percentage paid in cash for US acquiring firms and includes mixed payment. The target shareholders will prefer cash because shares from a foreign firm may be not easily traded. The quality of the assets of a far away company is more difficult to assess.
The information asymmetry develops with distance as shown by Chevalier and Redor (2010) .
Conversely, tax system will favor equity payments. In European tax systems, the payment by cash is considered as sales and the shareholder will exhibit effective gains submitted to income tax. Share payments are exchange of assets and are not considered as taxable effective gains. The target's shareholders can defer later tax liabilities by accepting stocks as payment.
1.3 The contractual nature of a M&A transaction
The chosen means of payment may also reveal the specific characteristics of the transaction.
An M&A is an economic project and a contractual agreement with a seller. When it occurs, it signals a joint agreement between parties. The target's shareholders are not forced to sell (except in buyout transactions).
The risk of asymmetry of information is (partially) solved in such a contractual setting, by the level of the premium and by the choice of means of payment. La Bruslerie (2010) showed that choices are not univocal but occur in a process conveying private information from one party to the other. Mix of payment and takeover premium interfere. If the risk on the target's assets is important or if the acquirer is risk averse, he may prefer payment in shares. However if the perspectives of profit after the acquisition are large, the acquirer's shareholder will privilege a payment in cash in order to keep all the profit. Equilibrium between risk and return explains the choice between means of payment, and a trade-off will develop with the acquisition premium. If a buyer is insured against future bad news through a payment by shares, he can offer a better price. This equilibrium may give "corner solutions", i.e. either full cash or full share payments. But it may also lead to mixed payment were the percentage paid in cash is a relevant measure of information asymmetry. The same calculus is followed from an inverse point of view by the targets' shareholders. They are exposed to an information risk on the future gains in synergy and on the expected profit of the newly merged company. If they are expecting high profit or if they are delivered optimistic information, they will prefer share payment (for a given price paid). Except for corner solution where other determinants fully explains all-cash or all-shares payments, the percentage of cash in mixed payment schemes is part of the deal and defines the equilibrium concurrently with the agreed price.
In a model, La Bruslerie (2010) shows that, from the buyer's point of view, (i) correlated activities and economic risk between the target and the acquiring firms will result in a larger payment with cash; (ii) a trade-off develops between the percentage in cash and the premium paid in the acquisition. For the acquirer, the cash payment portion increases with the perspectives of profit due to synergy gains. The seller will accept a negative trade-off between a higher (lower) cash payment and a lower (higher) transaction price (i.e., a lower/higher portion of the expected acquisition gain). It is shown that mixed payment will only develop between "corner solutions" of full cash or full share payments, where the expected profit from the acquisition is between two limits.
The regulatory environment may also play a significant role in the contract setting. Some countries developed investor protection regulations which facilitate M&A transactions. In the European Union, a regulation is effective and gives strength to the protection of shareholders. This is why we restricted both targets and acquirers to be public firms. A sample of 528 transactions is followed. We checked the used mode of payment through the data. A lot of deals are qualified "cash only" or "stock only" in the data base. Mixed payment transactions have also been screened. Those qualified as "hybrid" show a payment scheme with a percentage of cash and stocks. We only consider "pure" mixed payment with a percentage of cash and a percentage of stock summing up to one. Some deals are qualified as "unknown".
By looking at each operation syllabus we can allocated a lot of them to mix payment schemes.
Deals with earn out payment considerations are excluded because of this uncertainty and complex features. Some transactions may involve payment in debt (particularly in the UK).
This possibility is proposed alternatively with a cash payment. When analyzing deals with a debt payment, they generally appear to be equivalent to cash payment. So "cash payments" in the paper are defined as in Faccio and Masulis (2005) An important number of deals were private deals. Direct negotiation between the two parties converged and a block sale occurred. A total of 66 private transactions were identified, often linked to going private operations. All these private acquisition are "cash only" deals.
The sample of targets firms shows a large number of deals targeted at British firms (43%). Martynova and Renneboog (2009) noticed the same dominance of British firms in their sample. The transactions initiated by acquirers located in the EU represent 79% of the sample (see Table 2 ). Cross border deals (21% of the total) will refer to outside EU acquirers. Table 3 analyzes the origin country of the target by means of payment. We introduce a distinction between cross border acquirers coming from the USA and acquirers coming from the rest of the world. We see that pure intra country deals are more often paid full share than full cash.
Conversely, non US acquirer entering into a cross border acquisition will pay 9 times out of 10 fully in cash. However looking at initiators coming from other EU countries or from the USA, they have similar proportions of mean of payment. For instance, we cannot say that US acquirers will systematically pay in cash. They use full cash payment only 3 times out of 4. Table 3 Target country and means of payment (Number of transactions, sample of 432 European transactions, period 2000-2010, see Table  2) We analyzed the industry sector of the acquirer and the target firm using the Thomson Financial mid code. A total of 219 deals (51%) are within industry M&As.
Target
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A deal is aimed at buying a large block of stocks, generally giving the initiator majority of the equity capital. However the aim to get a controlling block should at the end take into account the percentage of share previously owned by the bidder. A toehold block may explain why the percentage of shares sought is lower, although it gives a controlling position at the end of the deal. A first feature of M&A transactions is the percentage of shares acquired in the deal. It cumulates with the percentage of shares previously held to give the percentage of shares owned after the transaction. On average over the sample, the percentage of acquired shares is 58%, the percentage sought in the deal is 63% and the percentage owned after the transaction is 73% of the capital. It means that significant toeholds exist representing on the average 15% of the capital. It is explained by the subsidiary feature of many target firms. A total of 101 targets are subsidiary (19% of the total sample). Among the subsidiary targets sub sample, the toehold percentage is on average 45.6% (median 54.6%) of the capital. The non subsidiary firms have an average toehold of 8.5%.
In a contractual approach a deal is an agreement set on a quantity and a price. Looking at firm's acquisition, the quantity side is the percentage of shares of the target acquired in the transaction. It cumulates with shares previously held by the bidder. Looking at means of payment, the percentage of shares acquired in the deal is similar using hybrid or share payments considerations. Cash payments exhibit lower acquired percentage and lower owned percentage after the deal. This is explained mainly by private block acquisition where the average bought block represents 22% of the capital. However, in that situation, the toehold is more important and shows a significant previous investment in the target's capital (around 23%). The cash payment in public takeover is targeted at larger acquisition of capital (average of 65%). As a result we see that the aim of M&A transactions is control because the final owned percentage is largely around 80 to 90% of the capital of the target firm. We separate in the cash deals those following a private acquisition mechanism and those following a public takeover bid procedure. Private deals seem to follow a rationale of control building process. Table 4 Percentage of target's capital acquired in the deal and held after (Sample of 432 European transactions; [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] The average data in table 4 will cover very different situations particularly for cash payments where the median is lower than the mean. M&A transactions are joint contractual agreements between the bidder and the shareholders of the target firm, which are characterized (among other variables) by the percentage of acquired shares. If the means of payment have no significant influence on the contract setting, we will get similarly distributed variables in table 4 and no significant differences in the percentage of acquired or owned capital. A t-test of average is run to check if the difference in percentages of capital acquired or owned is significant according the mean of payment. Table 5 puts into evidence different rationales.
The percentages of capital got through different means of payment are significantly different.
The nature of the deal is different if we consider cash payment in private or public transaction.
Cash payment involves percentages of capital of the target firm significantly larger than the other means of payment. The unidimensional test shows that the choice of mean of payment interferes with one of the main terms of the contractual setting. For rational players it is a significant variable that influence the agreements. However, in any situation, the averages are not different when considering hybrid and full share payments. If we look at the targeted share of capital, there is no difference in the nature of the deal between hybrid and share payments. 
Means of payment % acq'd in the deal % owned after
EBIT_ROA
Target EBIT divided by Total Assets for the last 12 months ending on the date of the most current financial information ENT_VAL Enterprise Value of the target calculated by multiplying the number of actual target shares outstanding (from the most recent balance sheet released prior to the announcement) by the offer price and then by adding the cost to acquire convertible securities, plus short-term debt, straight debt, and preferred equity minus cash and marketable securities, stated in millions. This data item is for the enterprise value of 100% of the company based on the offering price, regardless of how much was actually acquired in the transaction.
EQ_VAL
Equity Value of the target calculated by multiplying the actual number of target shares outstanding from its most recent balance sheet by the offer price per share plus the cost to acquire convertible securities, stated in millions. This data item is for the equity value of 100% of the company based on the offering price. 
TARG_LEV1
Target long term debt divided by total capitalization as of the date of the most current financial information. Total capitalization is long term debt plus equity. 
TARG_Q
Ratio of Enterprise Value to Target Capitalization: Enterprise value is calculated by multiplying the number of actual target shares outstanding by the offer price and then by adding the cost to acquire convertible securities, plus short-term debt, straight debt, and preferred equity minus cash and marketable securities. Capitalization is defined at Short-Term Debt + Long-Term Debt + Shareholder's Equity as of the date of the most current financial information prior to the announcement.
TARG_Q1
Ratio of Enterprise Value to Net Assets: Enterprise value divided by target net assets as of the date of the most current financial information. The enterprise value of a transaction is calculated by multiplying the number of target actual shares outstanding from its most recent balance sheet by the offer price and then by adding the cost to acquire convertible securities, plus short-term debt, straight debt, and preferred equity minus cash and marketable securities as of the date of the most recent financial information The variables considered to determine the contractual setting of M&As are those mentioned in the literature.
Financing conditions of the acquirer is a first explanation of the choice of means of payment and of the paid price. Cash capacity of the acquirer is identified with ACQ_PC_CASH and ACQ_PC_EBITDA. Raising debt is also a substitute to internal cash payment: It depends on the debt capacity of the acquiring firm. Two variables can be used to proxy it: The collateral value of his assets is ACQ_PC_PPE; it is expressed as the ratio of net debt compared to the acquirer's plant, property and equipment. A low value shows an important debt capacity based on fixed assets. The other variable is the acquirer's financial debt leverage ACQ_LEV.
The idea here is simply that highly leveraged firms are more likely to choose equity financing.
These variables are drawn from the financial report at the end of the year prior to the deal.
Target leverage is also an element that can influence the acquirer capacity to finance the deal.
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In a situation of success, a low leveraged subsidiary with a good debt capacity will help the initiator to finance the deal using debt and cash. TARG_LEV is a variable which measure the target financial leverage. It is set as the ratio of the equity value of the target valued (using the offer price) divided by the total enterprise value of the target (with equity also taken at the offer price) minus one. This leverage is market valued. We also use TARG_LEV1 which is book valued. The cash situation of the target is also an element which is of interest because a buyer cans self pay an acquisition. We used the variable TARG_PC_CASH. A good cashflow from the target is also an element which helps to repay debt issued by the initiator when implementing the transaction. We considered the EBIT_ROA ratio
The target Tobin's Q may be proxied by the ratio of his equity valued at the offer price compared with the book value of equity at the last financial report named TARG_Q in table 8.
Another proxy (labeled TARG_Q1) measures the acquirer Tobin's Q using the ratio of his market value four weeks before the transaction divide by his equity net asset amount taken from the mast financial report (ACQ_Q). The Q values measure the growth opportunities of the buyer and of the seller. It also proxies a possible market overvaluation of the acquirer's stock value.
The PERC_ACQ_SH_ISSUED variable is used as a proxy for assessing a risk on the control situation of the acquirer. As in Faccio and Masulis (2005) , this variable is set using a 20% control threshold. The control situation of family firms is acknowledged using a dummy DUM_TARG_FAM_OWN. Another dummy takes into account the subsidiary feature of the target (DUM_SUBSIDIARY)
The competitive nature of the takeover has been identified in the literature as a strong argument for cash payments. The idea is simple: cash is a signal of the will of the bidder to acquire a target and deter competition by other potential bidders (Fishman ,1989; Berkovitch and Narayanan, 1990; Cornu and Isakov, 2000) The competitive context can be measured by a dummy variable (DUM_CHALLGD_DEAL). A dummy for friendly attitude of the target is also used (FRIEN_ATTITUD).
We introduce a variable for toehold (which is set comparing the percentage of share own after the transaction and the percentage acquired through the transaction). The variable TOEHOLD halshs-00636614, version 1 -27 Oct 2011
gives the percentage of share owned before. A dummy DUM_TOE is also used when toehold exists. Toeholds may limit asymmetry of information.
The double asymmetry of information using the relative size of the target compared with the size of the bidder. A first measure of asymmetry following Hansen (1987) is the relative net asset values using book data (ASYMMETRY1). Another relative value is set comparing the transaction value spent in the transaction (TRANS_VAL) and the market value of the acquirer valued 4 weeks before (ASSYMMETRY2). The relative size is also measured comparing the total book assets (ASYMMETRY3). We may think that the Q value of each firm is also a proxy of some internal value that is not disclosed in the financial report. Each firm knows better his own growth potential. The relative size of it may be a measure of the internal private information discrepancy between the two (ASYMMETRY4).
The deal characteristics are measured using the premium (OFFER_PREMIUM_1W) The TRANS_VAL value is in absolute size; it is used to see if the absolute amount of the transaction influences its outcome. The economic context of the deal and the purpose of business diversification is followed thought the dummy SAME_SECTOR.
A filtering has been applied to the asymmetry, the leverage, and the Tobin's Q variables. We eliminate the extreme values below the 1% and above the 99% of the cumulated distribution. 
The proxy of asymmetry of information shows that the bidder is relatively better informed than the target. However the relative Q ratio (ASYMMETRY4) is interesting in the sense that it is above 1. It should not be considered as a good measure in absolute terms because our measures of acquirer's Q and target's Q are not perfectly homogenous.
The correlation matrix among information asymmetry measures (see Annex 2) shows that the variables ASYMMETRY1, ASYMMETRY2 and ASYMMETRY3 are highly correlated .ASYMMETRY 2 is populated with a limited number of observations. It is cross correlated with ASYMMETRY3 and ACQ_LEV. We will hereafter only consider either ASYMMETRY1 or ASYMMETR3. The two variables TAR_LEV and TARG_LEV1 are perfectly correlate and redundant. We choose TARG_LEV. The two TARG_Q and TARG_Q1 measures are also highly correlated. We choose the first.
The descriptive statistics of the variable are presented in Annex 1. The Tobin's Q value of the target and the acquirer are similar (3.6 vs. 3.3). An average toehold of 14% for those firm holding shares (30% of the sample) is evidenced. The acquirer seeks a percentage of 61% of the target's capital. He gets only 58%, so a 3% disequilibrium is evidenced. Due to previous toeholds, the percentage sought after the transaction is 76% but the acquirer ends the transaction with a cumulated stake of 73%. The average premium is between 25 to 30% depending if it is calculated 1 day or 4 weeks before.
3 Empirical tests
Methodology and hypotheses
According Faccio and Masulis (2005) , « Since we expect both bidder and target preferences to affect the offer price and its form of consideration, we would ideally like to simultaneously estimate equations capturing the two parties' preferences. However, identification requires information about a target's stand alone value relative to its purchase price (takeover premium) as well as the form of payment. Access to information about a target's stand alone value is unavailable, given that most of these firms are privately held. This precludes estimating the alternative purchase prices conditional on form of payment. As a consequence,
we have chosen to estimate a reduced form equation that includes both parties' preferences as halshs-00636614, version 1 -27 Oct 2011 explanatory variables. ». The test we implement considers the transaction characteristics as a whole. Cash payment and premiums are jointly set. We intend to set up a simultaneous equations model explaining the means of payment and the takeover premium. The same methodology was used by Officer (2003) to take into account the endogeneity between the premium and the existence of termination fee paid to the bidder. However in a first step we analyze separately the determinants of the payment decision and those of the premium.
The variable conditioning the parameters setting of the contract are mentioned in table 9. We considered a limited sub-sample of variable after taking into account colinearities. The expected relationship of each one versus either the percentage of cash (covering the three situations of full share/mixed/full cash payments) or the premium paid is also mentioned. We introduce a distinction between the three main explicative theories: (i) the financing decision explanation, (ii) the asymmetry of information and contractual setting approach, and (iii) the conditioning by environmental characteristics of the deal. Looking at the premium, liquid and profitable firms can pay more. The same may be true if they have large Tobin's Q to time the market and issue largely priced shares. The asymmetry of information approach says that asymmetry of information is a risk which is balanced by lower prices and premiums. Targets which are subsidiaries, or where toehold stakes held by the acquirer exist, are more transparent to the buyer and can be paid more. The same is true if the opportunity growths of the target are large. The percentage of cash has a trade-off relationship with the premium paid. The context of the deal will also influence the paid price with an increase if it is competitive or if it is a cross border deal. Similarly for characteristics of the firms: for instance when the size of the target is large, the bidder will pay more in shares.
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The DESEQ variable takes into account a possibility that the final terms are not equilibrium terms from the buyer's point of view. It is the difference between the percentage of shares sought in the deal and the percentage effectively bought. A positive discrepancy means that, to his opinion, he should have paid more to get a higher stake of capital. So we expect a negative sign.
The acquirer's Q ratio is a double face variable: it can signal an overvalued share value and a possibility to time the market by the bidder's managers. But it may also signal good future perspectives of the firm (Martin, 1996) . Former shareholders may not want to share growth opportunities with new blockholders. To avoid dilution of the former shareholder's, the payment in shares to new shareholders is voluntarily limited. Financial constraints or limitation may explain equity payment and financing: this will occur when the percentage of share acquired is important, or when the size of the deal is important.
..
Determinants of the payment decision
The mean of payment decision may be analyzed as a continuum between 0 and 100% cash payment. This approach views the determinants as playing a continuous role to explain the cash percentage. Traditionally a linear model will imply that a significant given determinant explains at the same time a full cash, a full equity or a mixed payment. The hypothesis of a unique set of determinants over the scope of cash percentage payment is very strong and questionable. The alternative hypothesis is that there are possibly three different regimes of means of payment, each one explaining either the full-cash, or the full equity or the mixed equity payment. The idea of three regimes is based on the idea that the full-equity and the full-cash payments are « corner solutions » for a rational investor (La Bruslerie, 2010) . 
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In a first step we will consider globally the whole observations. The used of a Probit analysis to identify the variable influencing the decision of each mean of payment against the other two is not sound. Can we say that, when choosing a hybrid payment and rejecting full cash or full share payments, the acquirer is indifferent between the last two? We analyze pure alternative choices using a Probit analysis of a mean of payment against another one. With three means of payment, it gives three Probit analyses. Table 10 confirms that a larger offer premium increases the possibility of a hybrid or a cash payment. Asymmetry variable is not significant, but when the target is a subsidiary or when the acquirer has a toehold stake, the probability of a hybrid payment increases compared with a full share one. It means than the lower asymmetry of information linked with such a situation does not result in a risk sharing full share scheme. The presence of an important internal cash flow favors cash payment. The challenged deals are more frequently paid in cash. As Martynova and Renneboog (2009), we do not find a significant or consistent relationship between the bidder's financial condition (e.g. leverage) and the means of payment. A leveraged target makes the deal more frequently paid with shares or hybrid payments. The explanation here should be set in conjunction with the no relevance of acquirer's debt leverage. The latter has a good financial structure before the deal, and the new financial structure of the group after the merger should not be hit by a larger debt linked with cash payment. This rationale impacts the deal when it implies merging with a relatively indebted target. So the acquisition of a leveraged target is more paid with shares to limit the side effect of the acquisition on the acquirer's own leverage. This explanation goes along with dynamic debt capacity limitation which occasionally will stress the cash payment scheme.
INSERT TABLE 10
The acquirer's Q is positively linked with share payment, what is in line with the stock overvaluation explanation. It does not support the idea of privately known growth opportunities at the acquirer's level which would lead him to prefer cash payments (Martin, 1996) . The target's Q ratio is significant against cash payment. Good opportunity growths at the target's level may favor full or partial payment with shares. The target's Q is significant and goes with the probability to have a full equity payment. This is in line with what was expected since the acquirer is facing an information risk about the opportunity growth of the target. A large part of the latter's value is not linked with accounted assets in the balance halshs-00636614, version 1 -27 Oct 2011
sheet. Therefore, a higher exposure to risky information on the off-balance sheet value may push the acquirer to cover that risk using share payment.
-) Robustness checks over the whole sample
We tried to use an ordered Logit model where the dependent variable equal 2 in full cash, 1 in hybrid, and 0 in full equity payment situations (as in Faccio and Masulis, 2005) . We also tried to use a multinomial Logit test of the three cases in the spirit of Martynova and Renneboog (2009) . However the structure of the data is not conclusive and no convergent results are obtained with the full set of explaining variables. A restricted ordered Logit model with 3 ordinal dependant variable works well with 5 dependant variables plus a constant. Four out of five are significant. However this model introduces a unique model value and uses cuts to create three classes. A restricted multinomial Logit is also run. It tests jointly the difference between all-cash and hybrid payments and the difference between cash and all-share payments. The variables are not significant in the first alternative case but are with regard to the cash/share payment alternative. We still have a probability to choose cash payment increasing with the offer premium and the target leverage and a probability of choosing share payment increasing with the information asymmetry and the transaction absolute value (see table 11 ). This result illustrates that full cash and full share are opposite corner solutions (Carleton et al., 1983) . At the same time the variable explaining the choice between cash and hybrid payments are not the same because none of the previous ones are significant. It supports the idea that hybrid payment choice follows a different rationale and is explained by other variables. The overall regime of payment choice is a pure alternative between these two schemes. (2005) may explain because the limit observations of the independent variable, i.e. 0% and 100%, are overrepresented in their sample. This is also the case in our sample where hybrid deals comprise only 14% of the total. The Tobit analysis of the global sample is not conclusive and the algorithm does not converge with 18 regressors (see Table 12 This is consistent with the cash availability explanation and the financial limitation theory (Martin, 1996) . This is also consistent with the risk diversification analysis: when the merger does not develop in a context of economics diversification, the buyer is more prone to reduce his risk by paying with shares. The cash-share alternative shows explaining variables different from the hybrid payment setting. The significant constant means that, on the average, a 51/49 mixed payment scheme is considered. Then an important offer premium will reduce the percentage of cash payment, and
Ordered
for an average premium of 25%, it will result in a 43/57 percent scheme. The other variables are not significant, particularly the information asymmetry variable. A same sector acquisition will be done more frequently with a full-equity payment and not in an all-cash scheme. This diversification risk sharing effect determines a corner solution with either full cash or full share payments and has no impact on the choice of hybrid schemes. A competitive bid favors cash in full payment choice but not in mixed. When looking at simple correlation, the same is true for a domestic acquisition. Transaction value impacts negatively a full-cash payment.
This transaction value is not significant in hybrid payments (when analyzing simple correlations or the cash/hybrid Probit in table 10).
The conclusion we draw from the first step of the analysis is that the means of payment choice is a decision that follows different regimes (Carleton et al. 1983) . In given contexts, some determinants are important to justify full cash or share payments. The previous empirics suggest that for instance cross country acquisitions and challenged deals are all or nothing conditions which trigger a full-cash payment. Another effect is less important. Full equity payments are linked with the offer premium. Sellers are paid less in price but more in hopes by accepting shares on the newly merged firms. Asymmetry of information and risk sharing goal will explain equity payments. These two regimes of payment are « corner solutions ».
Hybrid payment introduces a continuum between the last two. They develop a complex scheme with a fine tuning of the many equilibrium variables shared in the agreement. The two most important are the price and the relative mix of payment. Hence this variable is endogenous and should be modelized specifically.
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In the previous tests, cash payment and offer premiums are endogenous. These decisions are coincidental in a contractual approach. They cannot be separated when analyzing M&A transactions. This point is not systematically mentioned in the literature, except Faccio and Masulis (2005) . It is more scarcely implemented in empirical test. It implies that the conclusion we derived in the first step of the analysis are questionable and they should be confirmed in a larger model of the transactions characteristics.
Offer premium
The offer premium is the well known term describing M&A deals. Its determinants are explored in table 15. We used a first set of 22 regressors including a constant and dummies for means of payment. The latter are not significant. The premium is increasing with the percentage of share acquired by the bidder. Challenged targets are paid more. We reduced the list of regressors to alternatives subsets of 10 or 6 variables, without any constant.
INSERT TABLE 15
The size of the offer premium is still increasing with the percentage of share acquired and when the deal is challenged. The percentage of cash payment is significant, meaning that higher cash payments lead to higher premiums. The contractual nature of a transaction appears with asymmetry of information: a large bidder relatively to the target will pay a lower premium. He can enjoy information superiority and influence the target to accept a lower premium. The target's Q is positively linked with the premium. Opportunity growth at the target level enhances the paid premium. The negative EU zone dummy means that intra European firms will pay less. It evidences the empirical fact that cross border (i.e. outside Europe initiators) acquisition will pay higher premiums. The absolute size of the transaction does not influence significantly the premium.
The DESEQ variable is the difference between the percentage of shares sought by the acquirer and the effective number of acquired shares. It is a proxy of disequilibrium in the transaction between the terms offered by the bidder and the strength of the agreement by the seller. For instance, tight conditions will result in a high value of DESEQ. The negative sign associated with that variable shows a link with relatively low (and insufficient) premiums. We halshs-00636614, version 1 -27 Oct 2011
will use thereafter the linear equations to model the offer premium either in a large definition with 10 independent variables (equation Premium) or a restricted list of 6 variables (equation Premium1).
Simultaneous equations
As far as premiums and means of payment are jointly set we have to use simultaneous equations (Betton and Eckbo, 2000; Officer, 2003) . We distinguish two models to asses the regimes of payment. In each situation there is an endogenous link between the terms of the transactions. We first tested a unique system for the global cash/mixed/shares sample. It will be used as a benchmark before specific regimes system estimates. We acknowledge that it ignores the existence of two regimes in the mean of payment choice. We first check a large system version: OFFER_PREMIUM_1W = a 1 *PERC_SH_ACQD + a 2 *PERC_CASH + a 3 *DESEQ + a 4 *TARG_Q+ a 5 *DUM_CHALLGED_DEA + a 6 *ASYMMETRY1 + a 7 *TRANS_VAL + a 8 *SAME_SECT + a 9 *DUM_EU_ZONE + a 10 *DUM_SUBSIDIARY ( dummy DOMESTIC_ACQ. This is in line with what was expected. However the information asymmetry variable is nowhere significant, contrarily to expectations.
INSERT TABLE 16
We turn to systems of equations based on different regimes of means of payment. We still have as dependant variables in each couple of equations, the offer premium and the percentage of payment. In the cash/shares regime, the dependant is a dummy for either full cash(1) or full share(0) payments, in the mixed payment regime the dependant variable is the percentage paid in cash.
-Cash/shares system of equations
The first system of simultaneous equations has a binary choice as endogenous variable for payment. It is a dummy variable representing the percentage of cash payment for full cash (i.e. 100%) and full equity (0%). Here the sample is limited to full cash or full share transactions. The difficulty is that premium is a continuous variable and the cash payment is a discontinuous variable. As mentioned by Officer (2003) we cannot use a direct standard linear approach in such a situation. We substitute the mean of payment equation using a linear continuous proxy identified in Table 13 . The probability to have full cash or full share payment is fitted by a linear form instead of a Probit equation 9 . We estimate systems of linear equations. OFFER_PREMIUM_1W = a 1 *PERC_SH_ACQD + a 2 *PERC_CASH + a 3 *DESEQ + a 4 *TARG_Q+ a 5 *DUM_CHALLGED_DEA + a 6 *ASYMMETRY1 + a 7 *TRANS_VAL + a 8 *SAME_SECT + a 9 *DUM_EU_ZONE + a 10 *DUM_SUBSIDIARY (3a) 
INSERT TABLE 17
The simultaneous equation test yields a more sophisticated view than a simple equation setting. The latter explains a dependant variable assuming no endogeneity in the regressors.
Here a joint setting exists between the premium and the mode of payment (either all cash or all shares). The cross relation is positive and significant: premiums are higher with cash payments. Full cash offer will pay premium increased by 20% compared with shares payment.
Compared to the single equation test, the difference is that the challenged characteristic of the deal is no more significant in explaining the premium. Intra EU transaction deals will have premiums with a 9% discount compared to cross border deals. Elements of the financial structure of the bidder (cash-flows and debt) have no influence on the premium paid. The In a binary choice between alternate means of payment it is rather difficult to find a more finely tuned agreement. The bidder can only signal the future value through the premium paid. As a result the transaction recorded is agreed but may present some disequilibrium features. Here the DESEQ variable is negative and significant. It signals that some bidders would have desired to get more shares than they effectively got. The explanation for the imbalance is simple: they do not pay enough and the premium offered was too small. The percentage of cash in the payment does not depend significantly on any variables. The result of our estimate on the hybrid sample is poor. The low number of observations and the large number of independent variable reduces the probability of a variable to appear as significant. Particularly the asymmetry of information is not found significant.
INSERT TABLE 18
We tried to limit the number of variable to increase the number of degree of freedom. In the panel C of table 18 we reduced the number of regressors. The sample is now 51 observations. what he wants does not appear significant and does not evidence poor premium setting. This is a strong difference with the test for alternative cash/share payments.
The hybrid payment allows a fine tuning where the characteristics of the transaction are more inflated with information. Even if a negotiation does not exist formally in a takeover bid, when using a mixed scheme of payment the bidder should integrate not only his interest but also the seller's ones. He knows that the percentage of cash is screened by the seller. We draw the conclusion that the transaction terms, particularly the percentage paid in cash, reflect equilibrium in risk sharing about the future uncertain value of the acquisition.
Conclusion
The analysis of the offer premiums and of the means of payment should not be done separately. We show that these two variables are jointly set up in a contractual approach.
More precisely the relationship of cash means of payment with the offer premium is positive:
higher premiums will yield mixed payment with larger cash. A trade-off equilibrium develops: when the seller wants to be paid more, he should accept to be paid more in hope (i.e. in new equity shares). The risk sharing nature of a M&A deal is confirmed and influences the means of payment. The double risk situation relies on a double asymmetry of information between the buyer and the seller as identified by Hansen (1987) . The choice of means of payment is a complex decision which can be done in alternate terms of full cash or full share payments. Hybrid payments follow a different rationale. The fine tuning of the percentage paid in cash is also an important term in a successful transaction and helps in delivering information.
Considering a sample of European M&As over the 2000-2010 decade, the determinants of the mean of payment choice are known and confirmed. Firms with a high growth potential and a high stock value may be more prone to finance acquisition with equity. Financial conditions are poorly significant as in Martynova and Renneboog (2009 
